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HEALING THE CARTESIAN SPLIT:
UNDERSTANDING AND RENEWING PATHOS IN ACADEMIC WRITING
(Word count: 7459 + works cited)

Introduction
Jane Tompkins, in a classic piece called “Me and My Shadow,” boldly shares her belief
that we should fight the traditional restrictions of academic writing—the ones that banished the
emotional, personal dimension inherent in the art of rhetoric. The tradition, she says, has
become the language of science and academia, an “intellectual” style built to transcend the
“merely personal” (169). She rejects this framework, replacing it with the contrasting idea that
language is a bridge between human beings—a means of personal connection, a method for
conveying emotion. Her words are personal, inviting empathy through an appeal to pathos. At
one point, she even switches to a more typical academic tone, creating a shocking contrast
between the two and illustrating that acknowledging the humanness of writer and reader gives
access to a fuller rhetoric.
There have always been rogues like Tompkins, but there seems to have been a growing
trend of this personal style in the 1990s. A glance at the February 1992 edition of College
Composition and Communication reveals striking examples, starting with editor Richard C.
Gebhardt telling, from his own perspective, how “strongly-voiced submissions” and even those
that take the “risky, self-exposing approach” (9) have affected the journal in recent years. His
editorial stance is that “being short, lightly documented, or focused on the classroom does not
make an article second class” (9). This more daring attitude, he says, was a response to what the
academic readership wanted. Gebhardt’s piece is followed a speech, given by former CCCC chair
Donald McQuade, in which he reviews the final hours of his mother’s life—not the usual
academic fare, but his address is something that readers undeniably find value in. Article after
article, this issue represents the trend of using a personal voice, a trend that continues in
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subsequent volumes for several years. It is a style clearly different from the procedurally sterile
and transcending-the-personal prose otherwise reigning in academia. For several years, this
style seemed to be gaining ground, but now it has regressed, leaving academia again exalting
logic and diminishing emotion, rather than seeing them as tools of the same trade. As Damasio
says, “The Cartesian split pervades both reason and practice” (251). And he is right.
The Cartesian split represents a dualism—the separation of mind and body, a division
that exalts the capacity of the mind by making the body’s world of feeling a source of illusion and
untruth. But this split, strongly supported by the drive to be scientific, dissects the living human
soul. The direct consequence is that authors write as if they and their readers are robotic and
without feeling. My purpose in this article is to address this waning of pathos from a rhetorical
standpoint. Lawrence Green, in the Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, says that out of Aristotle’s three
rhetorical pillars, pathos “has occasioned the greatest controversy” (554). I will use recent
research on the emotions to validate the human and emotional connection between author and
audience by inviting pathos back into academia as both a topic and method of discussion. My
purpose is to heal the Cartesian split, reunifying logic with emotion, and, hopefully, changing
the notion of what academic writing is or should be.
First I will look at the roots of academic writing in the history of rhetoric—particularly at
how pathos was part of rhetoric’s foundation and how it was exiled when logos became king, a
coup that left the academic style with a lop-sided and only partially functioning rhetorical
foundation. Next I will examine how the disciplines of neurobiology and philosophy have
recently offered solid justification for using pathos. Finally, I will venture brief thoughts on what
this re-emergence of pathos implies must happen in the academic future.

The Pathos in Classic Rhetoric
How we inherited a discourse devoid of emotion, lacking a critical dimension of
authorship, and situated so squarely on logic alone is a tale that begins in ancient Greece. Even
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though Plato hints at the rhetorical importance of emotion in Phaedrus, in this and other
dialogs, instead of using rhetoric Plato encourages and primarily uses dialectic, a conversational
process for gathering human understanding by slowly eliminating misconceptions and illogic
while progressing gradually toward a pure truth (Hauser 22-24). And understanding is at the
core of dialectic.
Aristotle, building on Plato’s ideas, teaches that rhetoric is the counterpart to dialectic—a
companion, a sibling—but not the same entity (133). And it is more than the sharing of
information; as even Socrates says, “I boldly assert that mere knowledge of the truth will not
give you the art of persuasion” (Plato 1265). In other words, rhetoric includes imparting
understanding (logos), as dialectic does, but it adds persuading the audience to agreement and
action though an artistic use of emotion. In dialectic, interlocutors may do as they will with the
added truth—or they may do nothing at all. But in rhetoric, the listener should be moved to
action—to do. And, according to Aristotle, it is primarily pathos that moves a listener. Also,
rhetoric, while it is still the sharing of understanding, tends to be an expert opening the vision of
crowds or a commoner rather than a dialog between experts. Finally, while dialectic seems
concerned with what is, rhetoric seems concerned with what might be—it is inherently
imaginative, dealing with possibilities and probabilities—with what is yet uncertain (Hauser 26).
Always practical, Aristotle gives an obvious reason for including pathos as one of the
three pillars of rhetoric: “We do not render our judgments the same way when grieved as when
delighted, or when friendly as when hostile” (138). In other words, because we are human, our
judgment (our reasoning) depends on our emotional state. No matter how logical a speech may
be, it is empty if the audience does not feel it (189-190). Aristotle values pathos as one of the
three main kinds of “proof” in rhetoric. As evidence of his belief in such, he spends much of On
Rhetoric “Book II” detailing the intricacies of emotion.
Despite its strong roots, pathos began to be cleaved from rhetoric, perhaps beginning
when the Romans, around the time of Cicero, attempted to involve pathos too abundantly in
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their rhetoric—bringing crying orphans, scarred old warriors, and dead men’s bones into the
court as means to persuade men and judges, creating an inartistic travesty instead of the real
thing (Green 559). In spite of pathos being turned into a gimmick, Cicero recognized its
importance, suggesting that it be used only genuinely—that a rhetor should never attempt to
make an audience feel an emotion that the rhetor did not sincerely feel too (560). Cicero also
connected pathos with ethos, suggesting that an audience would willingly trust a rhetor who
displayed an understanding of emotion (561)—in modern lingo, they would sympathize with a
rhetor who had apparent emotional intelligence, meaning “the ability to display, read, evoke,
and direct emotions” (Jackson 486). Along these same lines, in the 1500s, Daniele Barbaro
divided emotions into two groups—those that promote good and those that promote bad—and
he implored rhetors to use pathos for the former (Green 563). It is an interesting notion that
some emotions might be right and others might be wrong because it applies judgments of
quality to the nuances of pathos.
During the Renaissance, pathos was further degraded, in particular by Peter Ramus, who
favored dialectic, hoping to define “a logical, scientific discourse, untainted by nonlogical
appeals, that would win assent from the rational audience by virtue of rationality alone” (Bizzell
53). A short time later, Descartes described his dualistic view, which put body and brain
beneath, as mean material, and elevated the mind and consciousness above as the worthy
master. Pathos became the target of distrust, seen “as the base impulses, desires, or feelings of
the flesh... primitive... [and] based on deception” (Hauser 167). The trend moved academia
“toward positivist formal logic, [with] pathos moving even farther away, to the point where
rhetoric is popularly conceived as linguistic manipulation and emotional pandering” (567). But
these sterile arguments customized for a theoretical audience that used solely logic were only
perfect for “brains that do not exist” (Jackson 484), because no human being is actually like
that. Nevertheless, in many ways, this split perspective permeates academic writing to this day,
as we shall soon see.
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The Definition of Academic Writing
To proceed, we need to define the current state of academic writing. A useful definition
comes from Engaged Writers and Dynamic Disciplines by Chris Thaiss and Terry Myers
Zawacki, who look at academic writing and “alternative rhetorics.” They define the essence of
academic writing across all disciplines, and, according to their definition, it has three criteria:
First, academic writing must include “clear evidence... that the writer(s) have been
persistent, open-minded, and disciplined in study” (5). This first criterion fits closely with
Aristotle’s ethos—an appeal to the writer’s character and credibility. To create ethos, writers
need to show they are informed and that they understand what has already been said in the
conversation. They have to be fair-minded and unbiased, even admitting cons in their own
argument and pros in their opposition’s—an ethical appeal that shows the writer is a good
person. Interestingly, this criterion seems to suggest that the “evidence” of authorial persistence,
open-mindedness, and discipline will show in the writing itself—in the content, perhaps, rather
than in personal pronouns, narratives, or other stylistic elements.
Second, academic writing supports the “dominance of reason over emotion or sensual
perception” (5). If we stretch this dimension to Aristotle’s model, one might call it logos.
Essentially, this means a writer must use clear logic built stone upon stone, crafted with
integrity, eliminating fallacies or illogic of any kind. But it is important to note the underlying,
unstated assumption: Logic and emotion are two competing forces, and whenever one appears it
is always at the expense of the other.
Third, for writing to be academic, it has to be targeted at an “imagined reader who is
coolly rational, reading for information, and intending to formulate a reasoned response” (7).
This is surely the biggest stretch so far, but one could argue that this aligns with Aristotle’s
pathos. However, instead of describing how the writer connects emotionally with the reader, it
tells how the reader does not connect emotionally. It is, in short, an anti-pathos, suggesting the
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reader is without feeling. This third criterion, while slanted against emotion—focusing
exclusively on the reader’s logic—does have two important qualities: (A) Academic writers
should imagine a reader—that is, they are not casting their words into a void but are directing
them toward a real human being; and (B), this reader is a person who values logic. The
definition paints a picture of an audience, who, in addition to being un-Aristotelian emotionally,
is one who thinks clearly, abstractly, and in complicated terms—a sophisticated reader, not
crowds and not the common man. In short, it is the expert audience of dialectic.
Thaiss and Zawacki’s definition of academic writing echoes the three pillars of classic
rhetoric. Yet this anti-pathos inadequately fills the position that pathos once held. What’s more,
the credibility of academic writing is placed primarily in the topic, not in the voice or identity of
the writer—after all, Aristotle called ethos the credibility of the speaker, not the credibility of the
argument. In short, our modern academic writing is only the toppled ruins of classic rhetoric.
Experts speaking with experts (as in the dialectic) as well as students grasping higher to reach
an expert understanding are important forms of the “higher,” scholarly conversation; but when
logic is left on its own, there are obvious shortcomings, including the way an audience tends to
be treated coldly, distantly, and as if they are without feeling.
The investigation and expression of “alternative rhetorics” indicates that both professors
and students sense shortcomings in the current model. As I will argue next, we ought to veer
away from the current academic style, and we ought to embrace emotions once again, reuniting
pathos with logos to create a more fully human ethos. The first of the arguments for this reunion
comes from neuroscience.

The Holism which Refutes Descartes’ Error
Neurobiologist Antonio R. Damasio, in his book Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and
the Human Brain, argues that emotions are an essential part of the human psyche. He describes
the landmark case of Phineas Gage, a construction worker who in 1848 miraculously survived
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having a four-foot metal rod blasted up through his cheek and out the top of his skull. Just as
surprising as his survival and quick apparent recovery was that his mental facilities seemed to
have remained intact. But time soon revealed to his family and friends that he was not the same
Phineas Gage he used to be. The brain damage drastically altered his interpersonal skills as well
as his ability to focus on long-term goals—in essence, it had disabled his capacity for emotional
intelligence.
Damasio also cites examples from current research of patients with comparable (though
less dramatic) injuries—each of which seems to show the same lack of emotion. In each case, the
patient continually pursues behaviors that are harmful both socially and personally. One of
these, a patient called Elliot, passed every variety of test to prove his normality: the relations of
means and ends, the awareness of options, the understanding of consequences, the making of
moral judgments, and many more. He could discuss current events, politics, and economics with
ease. In spite of the data showing his acceptable functionality, Elliot, like Phineas Gage, proved
unable to continue making choices in his own best interest both socially and personally—a very
apparent loss of emotional intelligence.
After his brain injury, Elliot was unable to keep a job; employers saw him as unmotivated
and lazy (34). He no longer knew how to value one priority over another: his only priority was
whatever was immediately in front of him, which left him directionless and distracted (36). He
was able to relate the details of how his life had changed from before, yet he spoke about it so
coldly and distantly it was as if he were talking about something disconnected from himself and
any other human being. “The tragedy of this otherwise healthy and intelligent man was that he
was neither stupid nor ignorant, and yet he acted often as if he were. The machinery for his
decision making was so flawed that he could no longer be an effective social being” (38). The
lack of emotion had left him cold-blooded, unable to assign quality or make value judgments,
which left “his decision-making landscape hopelessly flat” (51). Elliot was missing the emotional
capacity to judge between bad, good, better, and best—he lacked the foundational premises on
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which to base and structure his otherwise perfectly functioning logical skills. This is a point I
want to emphasize: Even perfect logic has nowhere to stand if not on a value judgment—and a
value judgment must be made through emotion. But emotion does not make this judgment
alone; instead, it cooperates with sound reason. This distinction is important—emotion does not
work before, after, or in spite of logic. It works together with it.
Sociopathy and psychopathy are also examples of what happens when feeling is
diminished or absent, leaving logic to go on its own. People who have these disorders, Damasio
says, are often highly intelligent. “The threshold at which their emotions kick in, when they do,
is so high that they appear unflappable, and are, from their self reports, unfeeling and uncaring.
They are the very picture of the cool head we were told to keep in order to do the right thing”
(178). Damasio speculates that these diseases are likely linked to the same area of the brain that
was missing and malfunctioning in both Gage and Elliot, showing again that a person with no
emotions has nothing to guide the value judgments that distinguish quality and morality.
Throughout Descartes’ Error, Damasio works to unite body, brain, and mind into a
single unit. Based on the case studies he presents, he says,
There appears to be a collection of systems in the human brain consistently
dedicated to the goal-oriented thinking process we call reasoning, and to the
response selection we call decision making, with a special emphasis on the
personal and social domain. This same collection of systems is also involved in
emotion and feeling, and is partly dedicated to processing body signals. (70)
Thus neuroscience tracks emotions to the same sector of the brain that primarily manages
decisions and reasoning. This knowledge goes contrary to the Cartesian split and the way the
scientific community has viewed reason and emotion. Brain-damaged patients prove that the
mind and consciousness are intertwined with the physical body and the feelings it produces.
As he connects body, brain, and mind into a whole, Damasio describes something he
calls “somatic markers” (somatic being Greek for “bodily” and marker referring to the instance
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created in memory). Somatic markers occur when the body and brain together react in a fully
physical way (e.g., a sensation of heat in the skin’s interior, or an unpleasant feeling in the gut)
to an instance of pleasure or pain, creating a reference point in the mind that can be drawn on
later in order to make a judgment. Often these somatic markers are not brought entirely into the
consciousness; instead they become a “covert mechanism” that is “the source of what we call
intuition, the mysterious mechanism by which we arrive at the solution of a problem without
reasoning toward it” (188). Interestingly, and without going anywhere close to neurobiology,
Malcolm Gladwell in his popular Blink approaches this same concept—proposing that the
human mind has the ability to make sometimes surprisingly correct decisions without ever
bringing them fully under the light of reason’s consciousness.
It is important to note, though, that in Thinking, Fast and Slow, Daniel Kahneman,
building on a series of psychological experiments, warns of the dangers of relying too readily and
too uncritically on this same intuitive ability. But he does add this: “As cognitive scientists have
emphasized in recent years, cognition is embodied; you think with your body, not only with your
brain” (51), an undeniable linking of the two systems Descartes split so long ago. “An important
advance is that emotion now looms much larger in our understanding of intuitive judgments
and choices than it did in the past… . [It has been described as] the affect heuristic, where
judgments and decisions are guided directly by feelings of liking and disliking, with little
deliberation or reasoning” (12). Although Kahneman urges caution in following feelings, he
nevertheless acknowledges the powerful role they play in judgment.
These examples refute Descartes’ perspective that the physical body (including the brain)
and the metaphysical mind are entirely and distinctly separate. They argue that mind and body
are not two separate systems, but a single whole, a unified gestalt, creating a synergistic sum
much greater than the separate pieces could. Just as the mind and body are integrated and
interdependent, so are reason and feeling. Separating the two might be a helpful way to frame
the concepts, but it is not an accurate picture of how things really work. “The entire organism

10
[is] an ensemble… I am not saying that the mind is in the body. I am saying that the body
contributes more than life support and modulatory effects to the brain. It contributes a content
that is part and parcel of the workings of the normal mind” (Damasio 226). The case for holism
rejects the sterile, scientific categorization and containment of parts. My argument is much the
same. Science and art, logic and emotion, objectivity and subjectivity, it and I—these are each
categorizations that emphasize separateness. When separate, these various pieces must be
stacked into a hierarchy of some sort, which means one always has to go above or below another.
I propose another view: not two entities—a metaphorical it and I—but a single, unified whole—
we. Uniting subjects and objects, emotion and logic, shifts from a conflict of competing forces to
the creation of a whole substance.

The Reuniting of Pathos and Logos
To understand this holistic unity, it may help to retrace a few of our steps. In Phaedrus,
Socrates gives a grand metaphor in an almost Dantean fashion of the ascension of souls. The
symbolism is intriguing, and it pertains closely to my topic.
Socrates likens the soul to “a pair of winged horses and a charioteer” (Plato 994). The
horse on the right is a brilliant white, a divine creature, temperate, and submissive to its master.
The dark horse on the left is “the slave of pleasure” (848), “crooked” with bloodshot eyes—
unruly, headstrong, and deaf (1120), “giving all manner of trouble to his companion and the
charioteer” (1130). Lastly, there is the charioteer himself, the one who commands these powerful
animals. For now, I won’t explain what the two horses represent, but I will label the guiding
charioteer as reason. Reason cannot ignore the unruly horse or leave it to follow its own will,
focusing solely on the bright horse, for, as long as the team is divided, the chariot will inevitably
be pulled down. Instead he must bring the unruly horse under submission till the two serve him
as one—a team of horses. The metaphor becomes gruesome as it describes the charioteer
straining the reins till he has covered the dark horse’s “tongue and jaws with blood, and force[d]
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his legs... [till] he is tamed and humbled, and follows the will of the charioteer” (1139). Once the
horses are in harmony, they will lift the chariot, and united they will soar. One might jump to
the conclusion that the dark horse represents emotion. Others, catching the theme of this article,
might suspect it is not. Both would be right. But first, another point must be made.
The holistic way of thinking about the human psyche makes emotion a teammate of logic
rather than a rival. But, as is clear, the pitting of logic against emotion—the Cartesian split—is a
common way of conceptualizing these two. When followed, the split leaves a writer with the
dilemma illustrated by this diagram—a light horse and a dark horse—where choosing one means
eliminating the other:

But this is a false dilemma, an either-or fallacy that assumes that choosing one will cancel out
the other. The fact is, the opposite of logic is not emotion. The opposite of logic is the lack of
logic, or illogic:

Illogic comes in many varieties. Some are as simple as, “All roses are flowers. Some flowers fade
quickly. Therefore some roses fade quickly,” a dubious syllogism which “a large majority of
college students endorse... as valid” (Kahneman 45). Or, illogic may be the leaving out of crucial
facts. When asked, “How many murders occur in the state of Michigan in one year?” people
venture much lower guesses than when asked the same question about Detroit (Kahneman 46).
This is simply because the first question does not spark the recollection of stories of
exceptionally high crime rates in one of Michigan’s largest cities.
Having given illogic its proper blame, we must not forget that certain emotions have
been more than willing to help an illogical stance win a battle—supplying fuel and munitions
and whatever other resources it could muster. For example, when asked to guess about the
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likelihood of causes of death, participants tend to grossly overestimate the more dramatic ones,
an “availability bias” partially caused by the tendency to sensationalize these: “Tornadoes were
seen as more frequent killers than asthma, although the latter causes 20 times more deaths”
(Kahneman 138). Although logic and emotion may have colluded, in the end, illogic must be
held responsible for its own actions, as logic’s real antagonist.
If we agree on this, then emotion moves to a new position. Robert Solomon, in his True
to Our Feelings, agrees with the holistic stance taken by Damasio’s neuroscience. Solomon, from
a philosophical background, suggests that emotions are essential to ethics and to a person’s
general well-being. “Emotions,” he says, “are more central to rationality than even reason and
reasoning, for without them… reason has no point or focus” (5). Let me reiterate: They are
“more central to rationality than even reason.” If this seems unreasonable, it is because the
paradigm, for so long, has favored cold dialectic. But according to Solomon, when logic tries to
stand on its own, it has no place to stand. He later says, “[Compassion, an emotion,] provides...
the basis of ethics. Not reason, not custom, but emotion” (63).

The True Antagonist of Emotion
Ironically, moving emotion off the scale of logic separates the two—but I separate them
only to show that each has distinct attributes, its own strengths and weaknesses. Once emotion
is separate from logic, it can be judged on its own scale. But there is a still the glaring question of
whether to forgive emotion for its war crimes—for supplying resources to illogic during so many
skirmishes over the centuries. To continue, we first have to distinguish exactly how emotion was
offensive—or, more specifically, which type of emotion was involved.
Just as logic and illogic are two ends of the same spectrum, there are also two ends to the
emotional spectrum. As Cicero and Barbaro suggested, positive emotion leads to positive, logical
conclusions, while negative emotion does the opposite. Some people quickly latch on to this idea
of good and bad emotions and agree that happiness is a good emotion and that anger is bad.
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This, however, is like saying that inductive logic is logical, but deductive logic is not. Obviously,
each can be reasonable or unreasonable within its own sphere. Solomon looks at emotions in the
same way. Instead of labeling certain emotions as good and others as bad, he says that each
specific emotion can be good or bad in a given situation: Happiness can be good sometimes and
bad at others, and so can anger. This framework is founded on Aristotle’s ideas, who suggested,
“Righteous anger is anger that is… aimed at the right person, for the right reason, at the right
time, in the right proportion” (Solomon 181)—or more succinctly, it has the right target, reason,
timing, and quantity. An emotion can be right (one might say reasonable) in each of these
qualities, and it can be wrong in each of them too. Rhetorically speaking, this means one must
practice artistic decorum, an idea that brings us to a new scale, one that can be placed next to
the scale of logic:

Unreasonable emotions—emotions that have the wrong target, reason, timing, or quantity—are
the ones allied with illogic, and they are the ones that need to be tamed and mastered, so that
their old, unruly form is never seen in academic writing (or in the rest of life). And this now
explains the metaphor of the winged horses: The right side of the two scales is bright and
shining: sound logic and reasonable emotions. The left side of the two scales is twisted, dark,
and bloodshot: poor logic and unreasonable emotions. And it is the horse on the left that the
charioteer, reason, must force to obey. Once mastered, the dark horse provides lift, the team
unites, and the charioteer rises higher and higher.
Citing Walton’s The Place of Emotions in Argument, Jackson explains the belief that
“emotional appeals ‘need to be evaluated by boundary conditions that rule them as fallacious in
some cases’ and, in other cases, irrelevant” (485). Like logic, emotion can be displayed at
acceptable and unacceptable levels. But once the scales above have helped show the false
dilemma of logic versus emotion, they should perhaps be discarded, since emotion, like logic, is
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an intricate subject that cannot be easily summarized by a binary system or linear scale. If,
through the guidance of the charioteer, the target, reason, timing, and quantity of an emotion
are aligned, the emotion will raise up reason. The point, though, is that the unacceptable should
be shunned and the acceptable should be embraced.
As an example, one might look at the emotion of anger, which most people would
assume to be a negative emotion. Solomon says that “anger is basically a judgment that one has
been wronged or offended… typically aimed at a person who has been offensive…. Anger is
always about something” (19). And being about something, it has (or can have) logical reason
behind it—it is not necessarily an unreasonable emotion. In fact, Solomon adds, “The inability to
get angry is a vice just as getting angry too easily is…” (13). Thus, it is a bad thing to feel the
wrong emotions, but it is also a bad thing to not feel the right emotions. This applies to each
emotion: love, contentment, sadness, grief—and even apathy, the un-emotion. Each can be
reasonable or unreasonable.
What I have argued up to this point supports the widely accepted premise that illogic and
unreasonable emotion should never be a part of academic writing. But it expands this idea so
good logic and reasonable emotions are both positive qualities that belong in academic writing.
In short, people are convinced by poor logic all the time. But the fact that some are scammed
does not mean we should stop using logical appeals in our rhetoric. By the same token, even
though emotions are often used in unethical and unreasonable ways to convince the easily
swayed, that does not mean we should avoid all appeals to emotion. We should avoid the
negative versions of both logic and emotion, but as rhetors and those who teach rhetoric, we
should wield the positive versions of both of these. Emotion is necessary, even in academic
writing. It just needs to be the right kind.

The Dangers of Emotional Appeals
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Now that the nuances of emotion are more visible, as are the features that distinguish it
from logic, emotion is in a position to be accepted back into academic writing. But since we must
take care to tame the unruly, unreasonable emotions, there will certainly be some lingering
doubts as to whether the passions can indeed be trusted: I want to briefly review some
legitimate criticisms that contribute to the typical academic and scientific bent against emotion.
One of these is the belief that emotions are elusive and mystical—too intangible to
discuss in any scientific or objective way. In part, this is a truth, but it does not necessarily need
to be a criticism. Damasio quotes Pascal as saying, “The heart has reasons that the reason does
not know at all” (200). Emotion is a way of reasoning that is different from—but complementary
to—logical reasoning. This might paint emotions as too un-substantive to ever really be
understood. But Damasio contradicts this directly: “I do not see emotions and feelings as the
intangible and vaporous qualities that many presume them to be. Their subject matter is
concrete, and they can be related to specific systems in body and brain, no less so than vision or
speech” (164). This leads to two important conclusions: First, the flavor added by emotion’s
distinct type of reasoning is a positive thing; second, emotions are concrete and scientifically
observable, from the outward movements of the body to tiny neurons firing inside the brain.
Like anything, emotions can be better understood though focused study—hence the term
emotional intelligence.
Some are wary that emotions cannot be controlled. Solomon argues against this, saying,
“Most of our emotions, most of the time, are not entirely beyond our control” (190), because
logic can wrap around and through them, reinforcing and structuring them. Also, emotions
happen because of circumstances, which we can control as well, at least to a degree; plus we can
control our thoughts, speech, and actions (191). We are “coauthors” in creating our emotions,
Solomon says, and continues the metaphor by saying that “we can’t entirely write whatever we
want, of course, but we can write based on what there is to work with” (192). For a person to
embrace emotions, he or she needs to accept that they can be reined for the most part.
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The caution against overactive emotions is reasonable. Unbridled emotion can steer
reason downward. Yet, as we discussed, there is a converse danger: “Reduction in emotion,”
Damasio says, “may constitute an equally important source of irrational behavior” (53), as
illustrated by the examples of Elliot and Gage. Damasio also says that “taking stock of the
pervasive role of feelings may give us a chance of enhancing their positive effects and reducing
their potential harm…” (246). A keener emotional intelligence will encourage the use of good
emotions and eliminate the use of bad ones, till we arrive at the moderate use of emotion—one
that is not too hard or too soft, but just right—the Goldilocks level of pathos. It must not be given
to excess, like those who “love too much and hate too much” (Aristotle 216). Finding this
acceptable range, we become better reasoners than those who disregard or degrade emotion.
That brings us to the next point—the question of what is good, or on what criteria to
judge an emotion as positive or negative—what is the right target, reason, timing, or quantity?
Here is Damasio’s perspective on the quality aspect of emotion:
Whenever I call a decision advantageous, I refer to basic personal and social
outcomes such as survival of the individual and its kin, the securing of shelter,
the maintenance of physical and mental health, employment and financial
solvency, and good standing in the social group. Gage’s or Elliot’s new mind no
longer permitted them to obtain any of these advantages. (170)
In truth though, this topic of what is right deserves, at the least, an article of its own, if not
several volumes. The same could be said of the philosophical concept of quality—even if I could
define it, I surely could not do it in the scope of this paper. Let it be enough to say that, as there
is quality of logic—some bad, some good, some better, and some best—there is quality of
emotion too, with all the same intricacies. Developing emotional intelligence is the sure
approach toward the ambitious goal of understanding the quality and art of emotion.

The Limits of Logic
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Having considered the dangers and often unnoticed positive qualities of emotion, I also
want to review the often-unnoticed limits of logic—to address any lingering doubts about logic’s
reliance on emotion for a sure footing.
Damasio tells of a brain-damaged patient who deliberates for nearly half an hour
between two dates for his next appointment—simply wanting to discover all the logical yet
inconsequential implications of each option (193). This is a patient who, except for a deficiency
in emotional intelligence, has normal powers of reasoning by all accounts. Had he been fully
functioning, he might have decided to let an emotion-driven thought take control, like tossing a
coin or acting on intuition. In this way, emotion does make us biased, but, when it is reasonable,
it biases in a positive way, helping us distinguish more readily, easily, and quickly between the
good and bad, and the better and best (174). Emotions give us a shortcut, or perhaps the only
route, to decisions of quality—something logic struggles to do when left alone.
Just as emotion helps logic en route to conclusions, it can also help set the destination
before the journey begins. It is easy to find examples of logical premises, disconnected from
emotion, leading to horrible, logical conclusions. In 1927, less than 100 years ago, our own
United States Supreme Court favored a law allowing forcible sterilization of “unfit” or
“defective” women (a case called Buck v. Bell). In a case like this, logic can make value
judgments based on existing measures of quality, but alone it can’t set the original premises.
Logic is devoid of judgments between good and evil; it is never an ethical player: it simply
follows premises to conclusions. Thus the premises might be unethical, but the logic itself will
not be. And when the premise is that bettering the human gene pool is more important than
individual lives and liberties, then “evil” things are logical conclusions. Only emotion can decide
which premises to begin with, emphasizing the importance of logic’s companionship with its
counterpart, as Aristotle might call it. Or, as Solomon says, “It is our emotions that make us
human... not in contrast to our much-touted intelligence but in intimate conjunction with it”
(164).
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Kahneman also explores the weaknesses of logic by conceptualizing the mind’s thought
processes into two parts: System 1 makes quick, effortless intuitions, trading off accuracy for
speed—a logic required by a world where time is limited. System 2, on the other hand, makes
more labored and slow, yet more accurate judgments. The flux between these roughly matches
the scale of illogic and logic. Throughout the book, Kahneman’s primary purpose is to show that,
while quick logical decisions can be helpful and even necessary, they can lead to obvious pitfalls.
He helps readers to understand and then avoid these dangers (Kahneman). Primarily he
examines judgments of logic—as in the false syllogism or failing to relate Detroit to Michigan—
but, having seen how logic is intertwined with emotion, it is clear that emotional intuitions are
just as liable to trade accuracy for speed, again reinforcing the need for a master charioteer.
None of this suggests that logic should be diminished. It and emotion both have optimal
settings, which people veer away from to their own detriment. Damasio sums up this concept by
saying that “the action of biological drives, body states, and emotions may be an indispensable
foundation for rationality” (200). That is, as emotion and rationality are so thoroughly
intertwined, attempting to cultivate one while weeding out the other will always be counterproductive. They are root and branch, a single system producing a singular fruit.

The Future of Academic Writing
So where does this discussion of pathos, rhetoric, and charioteers take us, and what does
it imply for both teachers and writers of academic discourse? In De Oratore, Cicero names three
duties of a rhetor: docere, to instruct the audience, conciliare, to gain their goodwill, and
movere, to arouse their emotions (Green 561). According to Green, some critics see Cicero’s
three parts of rhetoric as distinct from Aristotle’s. To me, though, they are simply an audienceoriented version of the same, a subtle shift from “Is the author trustworthy?” to “Does the
audience trust the author?” This audience-centric scheme is key. Focusing on the audience gives
a purpose to all that I have said here. If authors care about those they are communicating with,
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their attitude is sure to transform their writing—and one of the main results will be that they,
like Jane Thompkins, will integrate pathos into their discourse.
Wayne Booth spoke of a “rhetoric of assent,” in which a reasonable audience would be
willing to change its mind in a given rhetorical situation. Jackson builds on this idea, saying, “If
we practice a rhetoric of affective assent, we open ourselves to the possibility that the way we
participate in emotional appeals in vernacular publics is ineffective or otherwise deficient” (490,
emphasis added). In other words, affective assent means that we are willing to change our minds
by admitting when our use of (or failure to use) emotion needs to be adjusted—an inevitable
outcome. This may be the exact thing required to renew pathos in our academic discourse.
Further research might go in this same direction, exploring how the abstract concepts from my
article can be applied to concrete practice, specifically, what paths we need to take to reach the
destination.
As we move toward this truly rhetorical style, it will certainly change the way we write.
We will become more expert in our own field of rhetoric, turning from dialectic and embracing
logos, ethos, and pathos. Ultimately, it means we will be owning up to our humanity as both
thinking and feeling beings. This, however, also means remaking the traditions of academic
writing, that super-genre, as Amy Devitt would call it, which includes all the diverse disciplinary
genres that combine to make a whole. To look at the implications this has for us as writers is to
come back to the beginning of this article—back to that current of personal, expressive, pathosembracing articles that were published in the CCC and other critical journals around the early
90s. It brings us to a point where we can each individually choose: While maintaining the
current strengths of academic writing, we can step into risky territory to set another trend.
Conventions and traditions keep individuals writing in a way that is helpful to the
community—flowing with the community. This invites convergent thinking: The group comes
together, (roughly) agreeing on the same constructs and goals. One might visualize this as
thousands of glowing particles flowing in a stream in one direction. Each particle has a unique
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path within the stream, waving up and down, back and forth, and yet the stream as a whole is
unified in direction and flowing on a clearly visible path—it is a whole. Academic conventions
make this unity possible. However, there is a danger that if the group (or super-genre) gets
headed in the wrong direction, no single organism in the network can redirect the course. Devitt
describes this phenomenon in her Writing Genres: “Cultural constructions, perhaps including
genres, also have the dangerous ability to ‘make themselves true...’ [For example,] if students
learn to support their academic arguments using logic and reason only, emotion and ethos will
come to be seen as inappropriate in academic arguments” (160)—here she describes
conceptually what has happened actually. Genres by nature are resistant to change and tend to
keep going in the same direction. Thus, anything that diverges from the existing boundaries will
be separated from the group—or exiled.
“These potentially harmful effects of such cultural constructions as genres are precisely
what critics of genre most fear… Because genres exist, they will have ideological power” (Devitt
160). Their power is inherent in the tradition and cannot simply be removed. But the system
also has a built-in fix for this problem: “Genres are still created and transmitted by individuals,
by human beings…” (161). A genre as a whole cannot simply shift its direction, but individuals
can. So when the direction of the genre gets off kilter, individuals must separate from the stream
and take a unique path—they must diverge, separating from the group and the genre. This
divergent thinking is the only way for the stream to change course. “From such variation—and
the transmission of such variations from one individual to another—comes the potential for
change, for critique, and for creativity” (161).
And here is the crux of it all, which is somewhat of a paradox: We must see the value in
both convergent and divergent thinking. We must maintain what is valuable in the old while still
being willing to change to the new. As Devitt says, “Writers need both convergence and
divergence; teachers can help students to develop whichever is lacking in particular writers and
particular writing situations” (156). And not just the students, but the teachers—we academics—
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can embrace both sides of genre’s paradoxical coin, cultivating that careful balance between
being submissively humble and daringly maverick. Both of these are vices when they are
exclusive, but both are helpful when a situation’s decorum calls for them—when they work
together to hone our judgment. We will see the traditional academic style as “both constraint
and choice, both regularity and chaos, both inhibiting and enabling” (156). It may then be the
case that a little more divergence should be encouraged. Perhaps, then, the trend of more
personal writing will begin again, not in an outright rebellion or the overthrow of tradition, but
in subtle individual ways, in slight, divergent movements toward bringing pathos back into
academic writing.
Those who do dare to do this will be set apart. Their particles will be seen flowing next to
the stream—still nearby, but distinctly separate. There is risk involved—vulnerability—yet this is
the way genres change, with one particle, and then another, and then another, until slowly the
new direction has more force, more particles, and more impact than the old stream. This is how
a genre can be renewed—but only if individuals are daring enough to diverge.
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